A conservator’s authority to execute a Lady Bird deed without a court order; The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC); MCL 700.5401(3); MCL 700.5423; Whether execution of a Lady Bird deed is a disposal of property for purposes of MCL 700.5423(3); “Dispose”; Whether the conservator breached a fiduciary duty; Roslund Prestage & Company (RPC)

The court held that the conservator (RPC) “did not dispose of—i.e., transfer—the property when it executed” a second Lady Bird deed designating a trust as the remainderman. Thus, it rejected appellant-Lucas’s argument RPC did not have any legal right to execute that deed on behalf of the protected individual (Barbara Greer) without a court order. It also rejected Lucas’s claim that RPC breached fiduciary duties owed to her as an estate beneficiary. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for RPC. Barbara’s husband Dale had “executed a Lady Bird deed on behalf of himself and Barbara that provided for the transfer of the home to Lucas upon their deaths.” After Dale’s death and RPC’s appointment as Barbara’s conservator, RPC “executed a new Lady Bird deed that would pass the house to the Greers’ trust instead of Lucas.” On appeal, the parties disputed “whether the execution of a Lady Bird deed is a disposal of property for the purposes of MCL 700.5423(3).” Noting the EPIC does not define “dispose,” the court consulted dictionary definitions and determined the word “means ‘to transfer to the care or possession of another.’” It then concluded RPC did not dispose of the property through executing the second Lady Bird deed. “The first and second Lady Bird deeds did not alter Barbara’s interest in the property. She retained a life estate before and after the execution of both deeds. And the only change between the first and second Lady Bird deeds was the identity of the remainderman.” The court noted that “the grantor of a Lady Bird deed retains virtually all rights in the property, including the right to revoke the deed.” In addition, “the remainderman in the unique life estate created by a Lady Bird deed has no interest in the property until after the death of the grantor. Therefore, by revoking one Lady Bird deed through the execution of a subsequent Lady Bird deed, Barbara’s interest in the property never changed; she at all relevant times retained virtually all rights in the property. And any interest by Lucas did not vest unless and until Barbara died with Lucas identified as the remainderman.” The court further found that because “a contractual agreement between the Greers and Lucas was not prepared and in light of the revocable nature of this Lady Bird deed, there is no indication that RPC breached a fiduciary duty to Lucas.”