Boundary dispute; Adverse possession; MCL 600.5801(4); The hostility element; Gorte v Department of Transp; Whether possession was open, visible, & continuous; Acquiescence for the statutory period; Houston v Mint Group, LLC

While the court held that defendants established their adverse possession counterclaim as to a concrete parking area and a landscaping area, it disagreed with the trial court’s ruling that they adversely possessed the whole “Disputed Area.” As to acquiescence for the statutory period, there were genuine issues of material fact as to “whether the parties treated the boundary of the Disputed Area as the property line for 15 years.” Thus, the court affirmed the order quieting “title for defendants in the concrete parking pad and landscaping area identified in” a survey (the Kem-Tec survey) but reversed the order quieting title for them in the rest of the Disputed Area, and remanded. The record showed “defendants, by relying on the plantings, parking area, and red fence left by the previous owners, ‘respected a line that they believed to be the true boundary, but which proved not to be the true boundary.’” A mistake as to the true boundary line does not defeat an adverse possession claim. “Defendants showed that their encroachments onto the Ginotti Property were ‘inconsistent with the right of the owner’ and therefore sufficiently established” the hostility element. Plaintiff conceded “the concrete parking area installed by defendants was open, visible, and continuous.” And the court found that “while the extent of visibility of the landscaping may have varied throughout the year, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the boundaries of the landscaping area were visible for at least 15 years.” But as to the sprinkler system, they did not establish “a claim of adverse possession. Crucially, nowhere in the record is there any clear indication where the underground sprinklers are even located.” In the absence of “clear and cogent evidence that the sprinkler heads even encroach on the Ginotti Property, defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claim of adverse possession over the property on which the sprinkler system sits.” The court rejected the trial court’s determination they “adversely possessed the entire Disputed Area identified in the Kem-Tec survey.” It noted that their “counterclaim did not even seek possession of the Disputed Area as relief, and thus on that basis alone,” it questioned whether they should have been granted summary disposition as to “this larger strip of land. But even assuming that defect is not fatal, the record” lacked evidence setting the Disputed Area’s western boundary.