Habeas corpus: Confessions; Miranda v Arizona; Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act “deference”; 28 USC § 2254(d); Whether the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; Whether petitioner’s confession was “voluntary”; US Const amend XIV, § 1; Lynumn v Illinois

The court affirmed the denial of petitioner-Michael’s habeas petition, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision denying his appeal did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. After unsuccessfully moving to have his statements suppressed as involuntary, he pled guilty to first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy for crimes involving children in his family. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that even though four of the officers’ statements made during his first interview “‘were delivered in a threatening manner[,]’” they did not induce his confession where he “‘did not make any incriminating statements in response to’” the officers’ comments (that he would be prevented from seeing his children unless he confessed to sexual abuse). The Kentucky Supreme Court also “noted that before the officers made any coercive statements Michael had admitted to touching [one child’s] vagina area three times. Importantly, those three occasions constituted three acts of first-degree sexual abuse.” Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. In seeking habeas relief, he argued that it “made an unreasonable fact determination by saying that Michael had not made ‘any incriminating statements in response’” to the officers’ comments. He argued that his confession, made two-and-a-half minutes after the officers’ coercive statements, constituted a response and supported a causal connection. However, the court held that it was not unreasonable for the Kentucky Supreme Court to adopt a different interpretation—that he “‘did not make any statements in response to the complained-of comments, despite their confession-inducing design, and remained silent’” after each one. Instead, he responded to other comments they made. Michael also argued his confession was involuntary. But the court held that under the “totality of the circumstances,” it was voluntary. First, it considered his waiver of his Miranda rights. And it rejected his argument that Lynumn, a pre-Miranda case where a woman was threatened with losing her children, was on point, noting there was no Miranda warning in that case and it was otherwise distinguishable. Michael was “a former Marine with a high IQ.” He admitted he had not consumed alcohol or drugs within 24-hours of the interview, and significantly, “[h]e admitted to three acts of first-degree sexual abuse before any of the officers’ coercive statements.”