Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) & Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA); Disability discrimination; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework; Notice of a disability; Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination; Pretext; Failure to accommodate; Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA); Interference theory; Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); 29 USC § 1140; Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act & Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Race & sex discrimination under Title VII & ELCRA

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Holding that plaintiff-Hrdlicka’s post-termination diagnoses of serious health conditions did not create a genuine dispute of material fact that would justify denying defendant-GM summary judgment, the court affirmed. As to her ADA and PWDCRA claims, it held that she “failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under either the ADA or the PWDCRA because her purported disability was unknown to either herself or [GM] until well after her employment was terminated.” The parties agreed that she “was never diagnosed with any medical condition until after her termination. In fact, she never even sought medical help for any symptoms or conditions from which she was suffering while employed.” She contended that GM was nevertheless on notice. But the court noted that she “made only a single, unsubstantiated statement that she was depressed without any corroborating medical evidence and without ever having sought medical help, and she consistently presented the issue as a workplace conflict, not a disability. Although a diagnosis is not necessary for an ADA claim to succeed,” the court concluded that “Hrdlicka failed to present any of the ‘[r]elevant information’ that [it] has found pertinent to determining if an employer was placed on notice of a disability.” The mention of depression by itself “is insufficient to constitute a ‘severe symptom’ . . . .” The court added that even if she “were deemed to have made out a prima facie case, [GM] presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.” The court determined that “chronic tardiness and repeated absences, coupled with Hrdlicka’s immediate failure to abide by her Attendance Letter, were clearly legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate her.” As to pretext, she failed to rebut GM’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.” Further, she did not “establish a failure-to-accommodate claim because she did not identify a reasonable accommodation.” Also, her FMLA interference claim failed “under the fourth prong because she did not provide adequate notice of her intention to take FMLA leave.” In addition, the only decision she claimed “was a violation of ERISA was [GM’s] denial of her open-door appeal.” However, GM “clearly had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying” that appeal and she did not show that it “was pretextual or that interference with her rights was nonetheless a motivating factor.” Finally, her age, race, and sex discrimination claims were “woefully insufficient and require little analysis to dispose of each.”