Motion to withdraw a plea of guilty but mentally ill to second-degree murder; Coerced plea; Compliance with plea court rules (MCR 6.302(B)(4) & (5)); Effect of shackling during a motion hearing 

The court concluded “defendant was not entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel, and the trial court properly determined that defendant’s plea was not the product of coercion.” Also, the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of MCR 6.302(B)(4) and (5). Finally, there was nothing to suggest “the trial court was actually or potentially swayed by defendant’s appearing in shackles,” and the court was unable to find his due-process rights were violated. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty but mentally ill to second-degree murder. Defendant contended defense counsel violated the principle of deferring to the client’s ultimate objectives. He claimed that he was directly coerced into accepting the plea by defense counsel. The court held that given “the trial court’s ability to observe the demeanor of defense counsel and defendant, especially in light of the expert psychological evaluations of defendant and defendant’s history of outbursts, there is no evidence suggesting that the trial court clearly erred in determining that defense counsel did not directly coerce.” Defendant also claimed that “he was more indirectly and insidiously coerced by being forced to accept counsel with whom his relationship had broken down.” The court held that contrary to his “argument, filings in the trial court reflect that defense counsel nevertheless continued to pursue an insanity defense at trial on the basis of lay witnesses even after receipt of the adverse independent examination.” There was no evidence on the record “counsel was unprepared to take the case to trial, doomed though doing so would likely have been.” In other words, the record plainly showed “there would have been no adequate cause for defendant to be appointed different counsel, and, in any event, it would have been highly improbable for defendant to have obtained a more favorable outcome by” going to trial. Furthermore, his “subjective discomfort with counsel is not grounds for appointment of a new attorney.” Defendant further argued that “because he sought to withdraw his plea before sentencing, his request should have been granted.” But he relied on inapposite case law in his argument.