Sentencing; Imposition of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for first-degree murder committed when defendant was a minor; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; The Eighth Amendment; Effect of the fact defendant was convicted only as an aider & abettor (not as a principal); Miller v Alabama; People v Carp; People v Stovall

On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that, based on Miller and Carp, “there is no categorical bar to imposing an LWOP sentence even though defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor” for a first-degree murder committed when he was a minor. Thus, it remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with its opinion and the Supreme Court’s directives in its decision in this case (Taylor). The court determined it was clear the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller did not “conclude as a matter of law that the Eighth Amendment categorically barred” a defendant from being sentenced to LWOP. Rather, his or her “role in aiding and abetting the murder was to be treated as a factor for the lower court to consider when contemplating whether an LWOP sentence was appropriate.” In Carp, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled “‘that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, § 16 categorically bars the imposition of a sentence of [LWOP] on a juvenile first-degree-murder offender or a juvenile convicted of felony murder on the basis of an aiding-and-abetting theory.’” The court rejected defendant’s argument Carp has no precedential value because it was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Carp was vacated as to its ruling on whether Miller was retroactive; other aspects of Carp, including its ruling as “to aiders and abettors, remain controlling.” The Michigan Supreme Court recently cited it “for propositions unrelated to retroactivity[.]” The court concluded that “for purposes of the Eighth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, defendant in this case can potentially be sentenced to LWOP for first-degree felony murder even though he was convicted as an aider and abettor[.]” But on remand the trial court must “implement the procedures and apply the legal framework set forth” in Taylor. The court noted it was not its “place to evaluate whether Carp is obsolete on” the issue of whether it is “impossible in even the worst aiding-and-abetting scenario” to overcome the presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence and “whether Taylor undermined or effectively overruled Carp on the matter[.]” Likewise, it could not determine “that the Stovall Court clearly intended to overrule or modify Carp in regard to felony-murder cases involving aiding and abetting.” These are matters for the Supreme Court.