Premises liability; The 2015 International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC) 106.1, 301.2, 302.3, 304.13, 304.15, & 702; The Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Act (MIOSHA), MCL 408.1009 & 408.1011; Distinguishing Wilson v BRK, Inc; Open & obvious

The court held that the case on which plaintiff relied, Wilson, was distinguishable and that “because the step was open and obvious and no unique circumstances existed rendering the threshold step unreasonably dangerous or effectively unavoidable,” the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant-Oakland Physicians Medical in this premises liability suit. As plaintiff, who worked at defendant’s hospital system, “was entering the urgent care’s ambulance entrance, she tripped and fell over the 3-inch elevated step at the threshold of the door, sustaining injuries to her right foot, knees, and head.” She claimed that the open and obvious doctrine “does not apply when a defendant violates statutes, codes, and ordinances.” Plaintiff “preserved her argument as it relates to violations of IPMC 106.1, 301.2; and 702, having specifically raised these alleged code violations in the trial court[.]” The court found it unnecessary to consider whether defendant violated other IPMC provisions she first raised on appeal. As to her reliance on MIOSHA provisions, “although plaintiff was an employee at the time her claim arose, plaintiff has not brought her claim as an employee, but instead as a third party.” The court found that because consideration of her “MIOSHA claim is not necessary to properly determine whether defendant is precluded from relying on the open and obvious doctrine, and no ‘compelling circumstances’ exist that would result in a ‘miscarriage of justice,’ we decline to consider plaintiff’s argument defendant violated MIOSHA.” As to plaintiff’s preserved arguments, her claims defendant could not “avail itself of the open and obvious doctrine because defendant violated” IPMC 106.1, 301.2, and 702, the court determined that Wilson was instructive. The “determinative testimony in Wilson was from the township’s building inspector, who had extensive, expert knowledge of the relevant statutes, codes, and ordinances.” The same could not be said of the evidence on which plaintiff relied, deposition testimony by two of defendant’s employees, who served “as defendant’s maintenance worker and security worker, respectively.” In addition, given that “there was a separate entrance to defendant’s urgent care without a threshold step, plaintiff’s argument can be distinguished from Wilson, where there was no alternative barrier-free entrance.” Affirmed.