Petition to resign as personal representative (PR); MCL 700.3610(3); Petition for appointment as successor PR; Judicial notice; MRE 201; Ordering payment of part of the costs of investigating a medical malpractice claim; Conflict of interest; MRPC 1.7(a) & (b); Ordering the sale of the decedent’s personal property to pay the PR’s fees; Alleged violation of the terms of the will; Approval of the PR’s fees over objections; Transfer of a circuit court case against the estate to the probate court; MCL 600.846; MCL 700.1303; Security for costs; MCR 2.609(A), & 2.109(A)(1); Assignment to a specific judge; MCR 8.111; Grant of a trustee’s requested fees; MCL 700.7904; Hourly rate charged; Reasonableness of attorney fees; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n; Motion for disqualification; MCR 2.003(D); Refusal to refer the motion for review by the chief judge

The court held that the probate court erred in not considering appellant-Thomas Howe’s objections to appellee-PR’s fees and in refusing to refer his motion for disqualification to the chief judge for de novo review. But it rejected all his other challenges, including those as to (1) the denial of the PR’s petition to resign, (2) the order requiring Thomas to pay part of the costs of investigating a malpractice claim against the decedent’s (Beverly) medical providers, (3) the sale of Beverly’s personal property to pay the PR’s fees, (4) the transfer of his circuit court case against the estate to the probate court and its assignment to a specific judge, and (5) the payment of appellee-trustee’s requested fees. In these consolidated appeals, Thomas challenged several orders entered in these related cases concerning his mother’s estate. As to the PR’s requested fees, the probate court did not “address any of Thomas’s objections other than to acknowledge that they were made. Without any findings or an explanation from the probate court on the contested matters,” the court was not in a position to review the probate court’s ruling or determine whether it “erred by approving the contested fees.” As to the denial of Thomas’s motion to disqualify the probate court judge, “the phrase ‘shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo’ in” MCR 2.003(D) indicates “referral is mandatory upon a party’s request.” In his written motion for disqualification and at the disqualification hearing, Thomas “expressly requested” that the judge refer any denial of his motion to the chief judge for de novo review. Thus, the judge erred in disregarding that request. As to the order requiring “Thomas to pay the expense of further investigating a medical-malpractice claim, subject to” reimbursement from any wrongful death recovery, this “was a reasonable approach for balancing the parties’ competing interests.” The PR had conducted an investigation that reasonably supported his belief “a medical-malpractice action was not warranted and would not be beneficial to the estate.” The court also held that “the circuit court had the authority to transfer Thomas’s circuit court action to the probate court.” In addition, the interests of judicial economy favored transferring it to the judge “who was already presiding over actions involving the same estate and related probate matters.” The court remanded for further proceedings and findings as to Thomas’s objections to the PR’s fees and for the chief judge’s de novo review of his disqualification motion. Affirmed in all other respects.