Motion for injunctive relief; Johnson v Michigan Minority Purchasing Council; Request for specific performance; Motion to compel arbitration; Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA); Judicial estoppel; Order compelling arbitration; Whether there was a binding agreement to arbitrate; Failure to consider plaintiff’s second motion for preliminary injunctive relief; Mootness

The court rejected defendant-VillageMD’s claim that plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal were moot, and also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ first motion for injunctive relief. Further, where the UAA “intended for trial courts to determine arbitrability in an expeditious manner,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in expediting the briefing schedule. It also did not err by failing to apply judicial estoppel. Finally, while the court affirmed “the trial court’s decision that plaintiffs’ claims against nonsignatory defendants are subject to the arbitration clause,” it remanded for the trial court to consider “whether any of the claims are ‘expressly exempted from arbitration by the terms of the contract.’” Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their first motion for injunctive relief. The court concluded the trial court did not err in holding that an adequate remedy at law existed. Plaintiffs “failed to provide sufficient evidence to show they would suffer an injury ‘both certain and great,’ i.e., irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction did not issue[.]” The court noted that “it was plaintiffs’ burden to establish ‘that a preliminary injunction should be issued,’ . . . and ‘[t]he mere apprehension of future injury or damage cannot be the basis for injunctive relief.’” In seeking to show “irreparable harm would have occurred absent an injunction, plaintiffs cite provisions in the operating agreement and the management services agreement where the contracting parties agreed plaintiffs were not required to establish irreparable harm in order to obtain equitable relief. However, plaintiffs, as the moving parties, were required to ‘demonstrate a noncompensable injury for which there is no legal measurement of damages or for which damages cannot be determined with a sufficient degree of certainty.’” They did not do so and the court was “unaware of any binding authority providing that a contractual provision alone entitles plaintiffs to a finding of irreparable harm.” Additionally, the court failed “to see how plaintiffs would have been entitled to relief on their request for specific performance.” The court held that because “plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a contractual agreement between plaintiffs and the individual doctors who once worked for [defendant-]Envision Medical Services, plaintiffs were not entitled to that specific performance.” Affirmed but remanded.