Wrongful death action; Intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA); MCL 418.131(1); Palazzola v Karmazin Prods Corp; Inferring an intent to injure; Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co; Distinguishing Golec v Metal Exch Corp & Fries v Mavrick Metal Stamping, Inc; Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Administration (MIOSHA)

Holding that that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants committed an intentional tort making the exception to the WDCA’s exclusive remedy provision applicable, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiff-estate’s decedent died “while working in the course of his employment for defendants.” The court concluded plaintiff did not show, “either with direct or circumstantial evidence, that defendants’ actions constituted an intentional tort because plaintiff’s evidence does not support a reasonable inference that [they] had actual knowledge of an injury certain to occur and that they willfully disregarded that knowledge.” Plaintiff contended a MIOSHA citation report showed they “knew of the dangers of faulty air-respirator systems and failed to protect decedent from those known dangers. The report found that defendants had violated multiple MIOSHA safety regulations, including that decedent’s helmet appeared to have multiple splices in it and that the compressor used to supply air to the helmet was in a position to allow contaminants into the air supply. However, the report did not establish that a particular supervisory employee involved in the events on the day of the incident had actual knowledge that decedent’s serious injury or death was certain to occur.” Plaintiff offered expert reports stating “decedent died from asphyxiation and that defendants knew that a faulty air-respirator helmet could cause asphyxia.” But the reports did not establish “that any particular supervisor had actual knowledge that decedent’s death by asphyxiation was certain to occur.” In light of the lack of evidence that he “experienced problems with his relatively new equipment or that [he] reported any issues to his supervisor” (E) before this incident, the court concluded there was no question of fact as to whether E or defendant-Bauman had actual knowledge he “was experiencing problems with his helmet or that decedent’s death was certain to occur from use of a faulty helmet.” The court found Golec and Fries distinguishable. In Golec, “the plaintiff reported a specific danger shortly before his injury occurred[.]” Likewise in Fries, “the injured employee had reported the workplace danger to his supervisor, and” the defendant there “explicitly acknowledged that he was aware that the specific equipment the decedent was using was faulty.”