Request for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act; “Career offender” status under USSG § 4B1.1; The 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Procedural reasonableness; Alleged miscalculation of defendant’s career-offender Guidelines range; Waiver of a procedural reasonableness challenge; “Invited error”

The court held that the district court did not err by declining to reduce defendant-Akridge’s sentence under the First Step Act where he conceded he was a “career offender,” and the questions he raised for the first time on appeal constituted “invited error” without a showing of “manifest injustice.” He was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and FIP. The district court sentenced him as a career offender under § 4B1.1, based on his prior convictions for aggravated assault and cocaine possession, to 55 years. When he moved for resentencing under the First Step Act, his “counsel represented that his career-offender designation and corresponding offense level remained unchanged despite the recent legislation.” The district court concluded that because his Guidelines range remained the same, and in light of his post-sentencing misconduct and his criminal history, he was not entitled to a sentence reduction. Akridge argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court miscalculated his career-offender Guidelines range. He conceded he was a career offender but claimed the district court erred by using “the wrong instant offense for purposes of§ 4B1.1(a)(2) when recalculating his career-offender Guidelines range.” He asserted his conviction for “possessing cocaine with intent to distribute” (with a 30-year statutory maximum) should have been used instead of using his conviction for “conspiring to distribute cocaine” (which had a statutory maximum of life in prison). This would have lowered his total offense level and his career-offender Guidelines range. However, Akridge did not raise his concerns in the district court and “actually conceded that his original Guidelines range applied.” This raised the issue whether he “waived his procedural-reasonableness challenge.” The court concluded that even applying the invited error standard, “Akridge induced the errors he now challenges on appeal and failed to show ‘manifest injustice.’ As a result, his challenge fails under the invited-error doctrine. And even if we reviewed for plain error, Akridge would still fail to meet his burden.” The court found that he failed to establish “the district court committed any error, much less a plain one.” Affirmed.