Termination of parental rights in a stepparent adoption proceeding; MCL 710.51(6)(a); “Substantially comply” with the child support order; “Substantial” & “comply”; Use of dictionary definitions to define terms undefined by statute; In re CDO (OK Civ App)

Noting that there had been no published decision defining “substantially comply” for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a), the court held that the trial court did not err in finding respondent-father (Riley) substantially complied with the order of child support. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting a directed verdict to him in this stepparent adoption case. Petitioner-mother (Amanda) argued “that the trial court employed the incorrect legal standard when evaluating the motion for directed verdict under the two-pronged analysis of MCL 710.51(6).” She offered a definition for the term “substantially comply” relying on a case from Oklahoma and argued “the trial court erred when it did not comport its analysis with her definition.” After reviewing dictionary definitions, the court held that, “under MCL 710.51(6)(a), a parent substantially complies with a child support order when they have made a considerable quantity of the payments required by the order.” It concluded that because its definition employed “the correct principles of statutory interpretation, we need not rely on another state’s opinion to reach our decision.” The next question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Amanda and her husband (C) failed to “establish the requirements of subsection (6)(a)—specifically, that Riley had not substantially complied with the support order.” The evidence showed he “made many of his child support payments, that he often caught up with arrearages by making lump sum payments, and at the time the petition was filed his arrearage totaled only $146. This small arrearage in relation to the thousands of dollars in child support Riley paid in the preceding two years is insufficient to show Riley failed to substantially comply with his child support obligation. Amanda and [C] failed to meet their burden under subsection (6)(a) and the trial court did not err in granting Riley’s motion for directed verdict.” Given that the court concluded “the trial court correctly granted the motion for directed verdict because Amanda failed to satisfy subsection (6)(a),” it did not need to consider whether she satisfied the requirements under subsection (6)(b).