e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 79108
Opinion Date : 03/16/2023
e-Journal Date : 03/20/2023
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : McGregor v. Jones
Practice Area(s) : Family Law
Judge(s) : Boonstra, Gleicher, and Cameron
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Motion for sole custody & a change of domicile; Entitlement to a de novo hearing; MCR 3.215(E)(4); Imposition of a requirement the objecting party request a copy of the referee hearing transcript from the court recorder & submit it to the trial court before the de novo hearing; Interpretation of MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d)

Summary

[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 2/16/23.] The court held that the trial court exceeded its authority by declaring plaintiff-father’s right to a de novo hearing forfeited for failing to submit a transcript of the referee proceedings before the hearing. Nothing in the language of MCR 3.215(F) indicates it authorizes trial courts “to impose additional requirements a party must fulfill before being entitled to a de novo hearing[.]” The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for sole custody of the parties’ child and a change of domicile. “The trial court interpreted MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) as authorizing it to deem a party’s right to object to the FOC referee’s recommendations and receive a de novo hearing forfeited if the party did not submit a transcript of the referee proceedings” before that hearing. The court rejected “this broad interpretation. Not only does no such language appear in the court rule, but MCR 3.215(F)(2) explicitly requires the trial court to permit the parties to present ‘live evidence’ at the de novo hearing; in other words, the trial court is not permitted to decide the issue on the basis of the record alone, without providing the parties some opportunity to supplement that record at the hearing if they wish to do so. Moreover, the structure of MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) suggests that the ‘reasonable restrictions and conditions’ to which it refers are restrictions and conditions placed on the evidence that may be presented at the de novo hearing to which the party is entitled.” That MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) permits trial courts “to ‘impose any other reasonable restrictions and conditions’” implies that the restrictions it authorizes “would be of the same kind as those found in” subrules (a)-(c). None of those subrules “suggest that a party could be sanctioned in such a drastic manner for failing to comply with a condition imposed by the trial court.” Reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing.

Full PDF Opinion