Sentencing; Enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon during the commission of a drug-trafficking conspiracy; USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1); § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A); Whether the district court honored the read & discuss requirement under FedRCrimP 32(i)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court clarified that, for purposes of imposing a sentencing enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) “in the context of a long-running drug-trafficking conspiracy, the government needs to show some nexus between the demonstrated firearm possession—actual or constructive—and the defendant’s activities in pursuit of the conspiracy; possession cannot simply be possession at any point during the conspiracy, without regard to any nexus.” Defendant-Kennedy pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of meth, fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, and was sentenced to 210 months. He challenged the application of the sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon while trafficking drugs, § 2D1.1(b)(1). The record contained texts from the relevant time period in which drugs and guns were both mentioned, and a time-stamped photo showing him pointing a gun at the lens. The court found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that the enhancement was applicable, although it “caution[ed] that the government showed the bare minimum necessary and this case rests at the outer bounds of our decisions on the firearm enhancement.” The government did show that “Kennedy both possessed guns and engaged in drug-trafficking activities on the same date.” This supported application of the enhancement. The court noted that determining “whether a firearm was present during the commission of the offense or relevant conduct within the meaning of USSG § 2D1.1 is more complicated in the context of a long-running conspiracy.” In light of the absence “of clarity on this issue and the need to give meaning to the word ‘present,’” the court took the opportunity to clarify the matter. It held that the government established the necessary nexus in this case, “albeit barely[.]” The court then considered Kennedy’s argument that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(i)’s “read-and-discuss requirement” as to the PSR. It noted that case law “makes clear that so long as the district court can determine that defendant and counsel had the requisite discussion, Rule 32(i) is satisfied. This is the case here.” Affirmed.