Whether defendant was unlawfully seized & interrogated; Traffic stop; Miranda v Arizona; Motion for a new trial; People v White; MCL 257.697(b); Prosecutorial vindictiveness; Sentencing; Scoring of 30 points for PRV 2 & 10 points for OV 19; Inaccurate information; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop; Failure to file a pretrial motion

The court held, among other things, that because the trial court properly found “there was probable cause to make the traffic stop, defendant was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial. Further, the circumstances did not warrant a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Thus, it affirmed both the conviction and the sentence but remanded for correction of the judgment. He was convicted for possession of a controlled substance (meth)—second offense, and sentenced to 18 months to 12 years. Defendant contended that “he was unlawfully seized and interrogated in violation of constitutionally protected rights.” He contended that the Michigan Vehicle Code “does not require that the center, high-mount, stop lamp on the back window of a truck must be in working order.” Thus, defendant asserted that the trial court erred when it determined that Deputy O “had probable cause to make a traffic stop on the basis that the stop lamp on defendant’s truck was not working.” It was undisputed the lamp on the truck was not working. At issue was “whether the light’s failure to activate violated MCL 257.697(b), thus providing probable cause to make the traffic stop.” The court held that “because defendant’s nonfunctioning light was not in good working condition, the fact that one of the stop lamps on defendant’s truck was not working violated the Vehicle Code and afforded [O] probable cause to make a traffic stop. And because the trial court properly found that there was probable cause to make the traffic stop, defendant was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” He insisted that O “violated the Fifth Amendment by subjecting him to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings.” The court concluded that none of the factors discussed in White was present here. Nothing in the record suggested that O “was aware of a particular susceptibility that defendant had. The deputy made one brief remark in defendant’s presence, not a lengthy harangue. And defendant has not established that the deputy’s remark was ‘particularly evocative.’” He did not establish that O “should have known that his words or actions were ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’” Also, the court held that “merely informing defendant of inculpatory evidence, by itself, does not constitute an interrogation.” He did “not articulate how the facts of this case reflected ‘a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself’ so as to bring the deputy’s comment within the Miranda rule.” As a result, the court concluded “the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant was not interrogated.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial.