Action challenging a city “franchise fee” under the Headline Amendment (MCL 141.91) & the Foote Act (264 PA 1905); Prohibition against a city’s imposition of a new local tax without voter approval; Const 1963, art 9, § 31; Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v Wayne Cnty (TACT); Taxpayer standing; Const 1963, art 9, § 32; Limitations period for actions brought under the Headlee Amendment; MCL 600.308a(3); Accrual; Morgan v City of Grand Rapids; Whether plaintiff’s unjust enrichment & assumpsit claims were distinct from his Headlee claims; Abrogation of the Foote Act; Const 1908, art 8, § 28; Vested claims; Lansing v Michigan Power Co; Real party in interest

The court held that the trial court erred by finding plaintiff’s Headlee claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. It also held that his unjust enrichment and assumpsit claims were not distinct from his Headlee claim, and were thus, likewise time-barred. Finally, it held that plaintiff was not a real party in interest for purposes of enforcing the Foote Act. He brought this class action challenging a “franchise fee” charged by a nonparty-utility and passed on to defendant-city pursuant to a franchise agreement. Plaintiff claimed it was as an unlawful tax imposed in violation of the Headlee Amendment and the Foote Act. The trial court partially denied defendant’s summary disposition motion. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by finding the Headlee claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. “[L]ike in Morgan, plaintiff’s only means of contesting the franchise fee as an allegedly unlawful tax under the Headlee Amendment was through a suit on behalf of the public as identified in TACT, which accrued when the franchise fee was passed by ordinance. It follows that, because more than one year has passed since that time, plaintiff’s Headlee claim” was time-barred. The court also agreed with defendant that plaintiff’s equitable claims premised on MCL 141.91 were likewise time-barred as they were identical to his Headlee claim, noting that, as in TACT: “‘If legal limitations periods did not apply to analogous equitable suits, a plaintiff could dodge the bar set up by a limitations statute simply by resorting to an alternate form of relief provided by equity.’” Finally, the court agreed with defendant that plaintiff was not a real party in interest for purposes of enforcing the Foote Act. “The Foote Act plainly applies only to electric utility providers. Thus, the entity here with a potential ‘vested right’” was the utility company. Plaintiff “and the class have no rights or interests stemming from the Foote Act.” Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant summary disposition.