Alleged malicious prosecution & violation of constitutional rights; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407; Exceptions; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(2); Tarlea v Crabtree; Vicarious liability; Mays v Governor; Absolute immunity; MCL 691.1407(5); Petipren v Jaskowski; Municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983; Johnson v Vanderkooi; Qualified immunity; Holeton v City of Livonia; Principle that a public prosecutor is not liable for malicious prosecution; Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Failure to state a claim
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and constitutional claims on the basis of immunity and failure to state a claim. In 2014, plaintiff was charged with eavesdropping. The prosecution “filed a nolle prosequi and the charges were dismissed.” Plaintiff sued the prosecutor’s office and several other defendants “who allegedly were involved in her arrest and prosecution, ostensibly asserting claims of malicious prosecution and violations of her constitutional rights.” Defendants moved for summary disposition based on governmental immunity, prosecutorial immunity, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity. They also argued that any claim based on plaintiff’s arrest was barred because the arrest was made pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, and that “any federal claims were barred by various immunities and the failure to state a claim.” The trial court granted defendants’ motion. On appeal, the court first found that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the basis of immunity. Because plaintiff’s complaint did not specifically refer to the sheriff or the police chief she failed to allege “they were not acting within the scope of their authority or that they violated any constitutional rights.” And the prosecutor was not liable for malicious prosecution. As to the police department, the sheriff’s office, and the prosecutor’s office, because plaintiff did not allege any exception to governmental immunity, “they cannot be held vicariously liable for any gross negligence by their employees. Nor can they be liable for the intentional torts of their employees.” Further, as to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the court noted that, while perhaps alleging a pattern of conduct, her allegations failed “to sufficiently allege an officially adopted or widespread practice.” As such, the trial court properly found “the municipal defendants were immune from any alleged constitutional violations.” Moreover, as to the remaining defendants, including two judges, the trial court properly found the judges were entitled to judicial immunity and the other defendant was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Affirmed.
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