Second or subsequent motion for relief from judgment based on newly-discovered evidence; MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b); The four-part test for newly-discovered evidence; People v Johnson; Reassignment before a different judge; MCR 2.003(C)(1); People v Pillar; Life without parole (LWOP)

Holding that the trial court’s reason for denying defendant’s postconviction motion for relief from judgment was insufficient, the court vacated its order and remanded for reconsideration in front of a different judge. He was convicted of murdering the victim, S. Years later, he moved for relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence, which consisted of an affidavit from an inmate, M, who was incarcerated with him and who implicated himself and his dead brother in S’s murder. The trial court found he was not entitled to relief. In a prior appeal, the court remanded, directing the trial court to determine whether relief was warranted under the four-part test for newly discovered evidence under Johnson. On remand, the trial court again denied defendant’s motion, once more without holding an evidentiary hearing. In the present appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding M’s “affidavit lacked credibility apparently and merely because it was from an inmate serving a life sentence.” While the prosecution and trial court speculated defendant knew of M’s claims when he filed his first motion for relief from judgment, there was no evidence presented that he knew of M’s claims before 2018. As such, “the affidavit constitutes new evidence that, on the basis of the record before us, appears was not discoverable before his first motion for relief from judgment in 2014.” Thus, MCR 6.508(D)(3) did “not bar the newly discovered evidence regarding” M’s statements in his affidavit. The court concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it found no reasonable juror could believe M was credible simply because he was serving an LWOP sentence. The trial court found that because M “is serving a life sentence and ‘has nothing to lose’ by confessing to the murder, no reasonable juror would believe him. This fact alone is insufficient to conclude [he] could never be found credible by any reasonable juror, and we cannot countenance a categorical rule that would deny a potentially-innocent defendant from obtaining postconviction relief simply because the actual perpetrator was already serving a life sentence.” The court also found that, on remand, the matter must be assigned to a new judge. “Defendant’s motion has been before this particular judge twice and both times the trial court’s analysis was the same: [M] was not credible because he was already serving a life sentence. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect the trial court judge to be able to put previously expressed findings out of mind without substantial difficulty were we to remand the case to that judge for the third time.”