Divorce; Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2); Effect of the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state spousal support order; Stackhouse v Stackhouse; Myland v Myland; Sanctions for bringing a frivolous claim; MCR 2.625(A)(2); Effect of failing to move for such sanctions; Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA); MCL 552.2603(3)

Holding that “the trial court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2) because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state spousal support order,” the court reversed and remanded. The parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment entered in a Virginia court. Plaintiff-ex-husband “registered the out-of-state spousal-support order in Michigan” and moved to terminate spousal support. The trial court sua sponte ruled that it did not have “subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state spousal-support order.” Defendant-ex-wife then sought an order for plaintiff to pay her attorney fees. The “trial court declined considering an award of attorney fees solely because it lacked jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support order.” The court found that in so doing, the trial court abused its discretion, and it remanded for the trial court to address the motion for attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a). Here and in Stackhouse, “the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order regarding the underlying proceedings. Stackhouse is distinct because it involved the death of a party to the divorce.” Throughout the proceedings there, “the trial court had jurisdiction, but lost it upon the death of a party. In this case, under the UIFSA, the trial court had jurisdiction respecting the enforcement of a support order issued in another state, but it lacked jurisdiction to modify such order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction. MCR 3.206(D) plainly intends to provide a party in a domestic relations case who lacks the ability to bear the expense of litigation the requisite means to defend against an action both during and after proceedings, regardless of the party’s success on the merits.” As the court observed in Stackhouse, “‘the interests of justice are served when the financially deprived party to a divorce action is furnished with the requisite means of prosecuting or defending the suit.’” The court concluded that despite “the limitation of the trial court’s authority to render a decision on the underlying dispute, defendant was forced to defend herself over an extended period. The lack of jurisdiction to modify the support award did not result in defendant not having to properly defend herself throughout the proceedings.”