Motion for recusal of the trial court judge in a termination case; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b)(ii); Canon 2(A) of the MI Code of Judicial Conduct; Okrie v State; Procedural due process; Right to the effective assistance of counsel; Court-appointed counsel payment policies & procedures; Prejudice

The court held that an objective analysis of the facts and proceedings in this termination case did not support respondent-mother’s claim that the trial court judge was required to recuse herself “under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b) and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.” It also found no merit in respondent’s unpreserved arguments that her rights to procedural due process and to effective assistance of counsel were violated. Thus, it affirmed the order terminating her parental rights. Four years before the start of this case, “the judge’s husband and her then partner in their law firm, represented a man with whom respondent had a child custody dispute.” The court noted the child involved in that case was not the one involved here (M) “and the person represented was never a party to this action.” The court found that respondent offered “nothing but abstract speculation that the fact of the judge’s husband’s representation alone creates a perception of impropriety, and that the judge’s ability to judge with integrity, impartiality, and competence may have been impaired.” Further, the court’s review of the file did “not permit a reasonable mind to conclude that an appearance of impropriety existed. From an objective analysis, no reasonable mind could perceive that Judge Sharma’s ability to faithfully carry out her judicial responsibilities suffered from any impairment.” In addition, respondent’s motion was untimely. MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a) “requires filing all motions for disqualification within 14 days of discovery of the grounds for disqualification.” She filed her motion over a month after the trial court issued the termination order. The case had been ongoing for nearly two years. She also asserted the trial court did not ensure that she received reports, and that its “court-appointed counsel payment policy— which she alleges does not pay for counsel’s review of reports ahead of hearings—prevented [her] counsel from providing effective assistance.” But she did not point to even one “report that she and her counsel did not receive,” or show from the record that any reports “were in fact untimely submitted” and she failed “to establish that her counsel lacked preparation or otherwise failed to provide her” with effective assistance. The court noted it was significant that on appeal, respondent did not challenge the trial court’s rulings “that statutory grounds for termination existed” and that termination was in M’s best interests.