Limitations period for victims of criminal sexual conduct; MCL 600.5851b(1)(b); Accrual of claims involving sexual assault; MCL 600.5827; Lemmerman v Fealk; Whether MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) applied retroactively; The LaFontaine factors; LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC; Legislative intent; Diocese of Lansing (DOL); Archdiocese of Baltimore (AOB)

Holding that “based on the language of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b), the Legislature plainly did not intend for that subsection to apply retroactively to claims that were already time-barred before the statute was enacted in 2018,” the court reversed the trial court to the extent it held otherwise, and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants-Dioceses’ (DOL and AOB) motions for summary disposition. In 2021, plaintiff sued the DOL and the AOB as well as defendant-priest (Lobert) for negligence based on Lobert’s sexual abuse of plaintiff in 1999, when he was a minor. Defendants moved for summary disposition on the ground that the claims were time-barred. The trial court disagreed, finding plaintiff’s claims did not accrue until 11/20 when he made the causal connection between the sexual abuse and his mental health issues. It also found that, “even if retroactivity was an issue, it would hold that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) applied retroactively” based on the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the statute. On appeal, the court agreed with defendants that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred. “MCL 600.5851b does not change the date of accrual for a claim to recover damages sustained by an individual who, while a minor, was the victim of criminal sexual conduct. Rather, [it] simply extends the time that an individual has to bring such a claim, i.e., it extends the statute of limitations.” It noted that “[a]ny statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff’s claims when they accrued in 1999 had long since expired by the time he filed his complaint in 2021.” It then found the statute did not apply retroactively. “MCL 600.5851(1)(b) contains no clear and unequivocal manifestation suggesting that the Legislature intended for it to apply retroactively. Further, statutes of limitations in this context do not fall into the ‘remedial-procedural exception to prospective application,’ which lends further support for the conclusion that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) should apply prospectively only.” As such, “regardless of whether applying the subsection retroactively to these defendants would impair a vested right,” MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) may not be applied retroactively, and plaintiff’s claim was time-barred.