Search & seizure; Warrantless entry; Resisting arrest; MCL 750.81d(1); People v Quinn; Whether the police officers’ actions were lawful; People v Moreno; Exigent circumstances; People v Trapp; “Exigent”; People v Anthony; Witness bribery; MCL 750.122(1)(a); Penalty where the underlying violation is assault by strangulation; MCL 750.84(1)(b); MCL 750.122(7)(b)

The court held in these consolidated cases that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on his resisting arrest charge, or by allowing his conviction of witness bribery to stand even though he was acquitted of the underlying offense. He was convicted of witness bribery, resisting arrest, and domestic violence. His convictions arose out of an incident in which he assaulted his then-girlfriend, later resisted arrest, and then attempted to influence the victim and bribe her not to testify against him. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the resisting arrest charge because no exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry. “[T]he trial court correctly determined that the police officers’ warrantless entry into the cabin was based on exigent circumstances.” As such, defendant “had no common-law right to resist the arrest.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by allowing his conviction of witness bribery to stand because he was acquitted of the underlying offense, i.e., assault by strangulation. “[T]he statute’s only requirement is that the witness interference occur ‘in a criminal case for which the maximum term of imprisonment for the violation is more than 10 years.’” Notably absent from this language “is any requirement that the defendant be convicted of the underlying offense.” Thus, defendant’s “interpretation reads language into the statute that is not present.” Further, the jury “was instructed consistent with M Crim JI 37.5a including that ‘[i]t does not matter whether the official proceeding took place as long as the defendant knew or had reason to know that [the victim] could be a witness at that proceeding.’” Defendant did not “dispute that this model jury instruction accurately states the law.” Affirmed.