Premises liability; Slip & fall on snow-and-ice-covered driveway; Whether the claim sounded in premises liability or ordinary negligence; Whether the driveway was an unsafe condition on the land; Open & obvious doctrine; United States Postal Service (USPS)

Holding that the open and obvious doctrine shielded defendant from liability for plaintiff’s (a USPS worker’s) injuries, the court affirmed. Plaintiff, as an invitee on his property because she entered his property to deliver his “mail—a business purpose,” was injured after falling on his snow-and-ice-covered driveway. The focus was whether the driveway was an unsafe condition on his land. Thus, the claim sounded only in premises liability. On appeal, plaintiff argued that a genuine question of material fact existed as to “whether special aspects existed that negated the open and obvious doctrine, namely, that the ice was unavoidable.” The court noted that she “admitted that she knew there could be a layer of ice beneath the snow. So both legally and factually, plaintiff is rightly imputed with the knowledge that the driveway presented a risk of harm.” She did “not deny that the hazardous condition of the driveway was open and obvious.” Rather, she asserted that it was unavoidable. The court held that the “hazardous condition was not avoidable simply because plaintiff could have walked on the snow-covered grass rather than the driveway because both the driveway and grass presented open and obvious dangers which plaintiff would have had to encounter if she delivered defendant’s mail.” It concluded that even “conceding that the grass and driveway presented a dangerous condition plaintiff would have had to encounter if she delivered defendant’s mail, plaintiff admitted that she could have refused to deliver the mail to defendant and that she has refused to deliver mail on previous occasions. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff could have refused to deliver defendant’s mail on the day of her accident.” The court noted that she “agreed that, ‘In any event, there are procedures in place so that you don’t have to access a property where you don’t feel that you can safely do your job.’” She admitted “that she could have refused to enter the property that day if she felt unsafe doing so, and she had refused to deliver to plaintiff in the past. Plaintiff testified that she does not get reprimanded for refusing to deliver mail if she feels unsafe doing so.” Thus, based on her “own testimony, she had a reasonable alternative to confronting the open and obvious danger of crossing defendant’s snow-covered property.” Because she “could have refused to deliver defendant’s mail, she was not required to confront the hazard.” As a result, “reasonable minds could not differ on the conclusion that the snowy driveway was avoidable.”