Civil conspiracy claim under 42 USC § 1983; Standing to sue; Whether defendant-county sheriff could be held liable for civil conspiracy under Webb v United States; Whether “personal involvement” is a required element

The court held that the district court erroneously read a “personal involvement” element into the requirements for a civil conspiracy claim under § 1983. Thus, it reversed the grant of summary judgment to the County defendants (the county and its sheriff, Fitzhugh) and remanded. In a joint operation (“Operation Candy Crush”), local law enforcement conducted raids on several shops selling cannabidiol products under the mistaken belief they were illegal under state law. They were not illegal under federal or state law. The charges were dropped, and the business owners sued defendants for violating their constitutional rights and conspiring to violate those rights. All the plaintiffs settled but plaintiff-Rieves. The court first held that he had standing where he alleged “causality” and thus, met the traceability requirement. It then considered the district court’s ruling that Fitzhugh could not be held liable for civil conspiracy under Webb. To establish a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff “must show (1) ‘that there was a single plan,’ (2) ‘that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective,’ and (3) ‘that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.’” The district court determined the “‘broad conspiracy’ of Operation Candy Crush was insufficiently personal to Rieves . . . .” Specifically, it found “Fitzhugh’s general awareness of the operation inadequate because he was not ‘personally involved’ in the investigation of” Rieves’s business. The court disagreed. Reviewing Fitzhugh’s role in planning the operation, the court found that it reflected his participation in a decision “calculated to achieve an unconstitutional outcome.” The district court’s reasoning was based on a misunderstanding of language in Webb. The court concluded “Webb does not demand personal involvement by each co-conspirator in every wrongful or overt act to be held liable.” Rather, it explained that “Webb reflects an emphasis on § 1983 civil conspiracy’s requirement of a shared plan[.]” Unlike this case, the operation in Webb “was not itself an illegal conspiracy.” Here, the court held that jurors could conclude there was “a ‘single plan’ in which Fitzhugh participated.” Further, a reasonable jury could find that he knew the products “were legal but encouraged his officers to go forward with the operation anyway.” The court also determined that “Operation Candy Crush is reasonably treated as a single plan to violate the shop owners’ constitutional rights because the raids were coordinated and carried out simultaneously, with the knowledge of all parties.”