Application to set aside a plea-based juvenile adjudication for CSC III; MCL 712A.18e; People v Butka (Unpub); Distinguishing People v Rosen & People v Boulding

The court held that the trial court was allowed “to, and did, rely on the impact that” granting defendant’s motion to set aside his plea-based juvenile adjudication for CSC III would have on the victim, and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. He argued it “improperly based its decision on the nature of the offense and usurped the” Legislature’s role. The court disagreed. Pursuant to Rosen, in deciding whether or not to set aside a juvenile adjudication or conviction, “the focus cannot solely be on the nature of the offense itself.” Instead, under MCL 712A.18e(9), the trial court analysis must focus “on: (1) the circumstances and the defendant’s behavior since the offense was committed, and (2) consideration of the public welfare.” The court noted that the trial court at no point stated “it was denying the motion because similarly-situated adults were ineligible. Rather,” it was clear that it “was concerned about the nature of the offense—both generally and in the context of the case.” And although the nature of the crime “cannot be the sole factor when deciding whether to set aside an adjudication, nothing in the statute or caselaw interpreting it counsels that the court may not consider it at all, especially in light of the requirement that the court consider whether setting aside the adjudication is in the ‘public welfare.’” Similar to Butka, the trial court here “acknowledged the seriousness of defendant’s actions, and did so in the context of the impact those actions had on the victim.” The court disagreed “with defendant’s characterization that the trial court ‘usurped’ the Legislature’s because, plainly, it did not.” It also rejected his assertion the trial court relied solely on the nature of the crime. Unlike Rosen and Boulding, the trial court here “did not focus only on the nature of the offense. [It] took testimony from defendant—which did not occur in Rosen—in which defendant explained how his life had improved since the adjudication,” and it considered his testimony. In addition, it “took testimony from the victim—which also did not occur in Rosen—in which [she] detailed the impact the offense had on her life and her desire that defendant’s adjudication not be set aside. Thus, . . . the court focused primarily on whether setting aside the adjudication would be consistent with the public welfare, i.e., the impact on the victim if the adjudication were set aside.” Affirmed.