Claims arising from alleged wrongful employment termination; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); An agency’s hiring, supervising, & firing of its employees as the exercise or discharge of a governmental function; Vicarious liability; MCL 691.1407(2); Intentional torts; Odom v Wayne Cnty; Wrongful termination contrary to public policy; Suchodolski v Michigan Consol Gas Co; Motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8); The court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal; MCR 7.205(A)(1)(a) & (4)(a); Whether an application for leave was defective

Rejecting plaintiff-Wood’s jurisdictional challenge, the court held that because she failed to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity, defendant-36th District Court was entitled to summary disposition of her claim that it could be held liable for wrongfully terminating her employment contrary to public policy. Further, while the trial court did not err in denying defendant-Crosby summary disposition based on immunity, the court held that it did err in determining Wood adequately alleged a wrongful termination claim against her. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s opinion and order in relevant part in both of these consolidated appeals and remanded for entry of an order dismissing Wood’s wrongful termination claims against Crosby and the District Court. She alleged these defendants and defendant-Chief Judge McConico wrongfully terminated her employment as a magistrate judge. Crosby was the District Court’s interim administrator at the time. As to the merits, the court held that as the “District Court had the authority to terminate Wood’s employment as a magistrate” its action in doing so was a governmental function, “for which it had absolute immunity from tort liability[.]”As a result, it “could not be directly liable in tort for terminating Wood’s employment in violation of public policy.” The court further held that the District Court could not be vicariously liable for Wood’s wrongful discharge “by one of its employees. Wrongful discharge involves an intentional act performed in contravention of public policy,” and the court noted that “it is well settled that a governmental agency cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s intentional torts[.]” As to Crosby, she failed to “submit evidence to establish that she had immunity and it does not appear on the face of the allegations that” she was entitled to immunity under Odom. But Wood did not allege facts establishing “that Chief Judge McConico or Crosby had the authority to take an adverse employment action, which would give rise to a common law duty to refrain from doing so in violation of public policy.” Thus, given that she “failed to allege an essential element of her claim” against them, they should have been granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Further, amending the complaint would be futile as to Crosby (who had no authority to fire her) and would not avoid Chief Judge McConico’s immunity.