Governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(2) & (3); Odom v Wayne Cnty; Application to intentional torts; Bad faith or malice; Gross negligence claim

The court held that the trial court erred by granting defendants-city, city crime analyst (Marshall), and city police officer (Ball) summary disposition of plaintiffs-the accused’s and his parents’ claims based on governmental immunity. The police broke into the accused’s home pursuant to a no-knock warrant, handcuffed his parents, arrested him on suspicion of a shooting, and searched the home. The accused’s parents explained he was hospitalized at the time of the shooting and provided supporting documentation, which the police used only to verify his identity before taking him to jail. After surveillance video confirmed he could not have been the assailant, the charges were dismissed. Plaintiffs then sued defendants asserting several federal and state law causes of action. Ultimately the case was remanded to the trial court to proceed with claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, and gross negligence. On appeal, the court found that the trial court “erred by concluding that defendants were entitled to immunity with respect to the intentional torts because it erroneously applied the GTLA, and because it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs.” The court first noted, “the party asserting the defense has the burden of establishing it. In other words, defendants must establish that they acted in good faith or without malice; instead, the trial court placed the burden on plaintiffs to establish that Marshall and Ball acted in bad faith or with malice. Second, as the Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Odom, the GTLA applies only to negligent torts, not intentional torts.” The trial court’s decision that “defendants were immune from the intentional torts under the GTLA was a legal error warranting reversal.” The court also found that the trial court erred by concluding defendants were entitled to immunity as to the gross negligence claim “because it erroneously applied the standard for governmental immunity that applies to intentional torts and because it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs.” It noted the brevity of the trial court’s conclusions were “particularly harmful with respect to the gross negligence claim because there were numerous factors that arguably could amount to gross negligence.” The court drew no conclusions as to whether investigative failings amounted to gross negligence, but found it was important for the trial court to consider whether the circumstances “could lead to a finding of gross negligence. A conclusory statement that there was no gross negligence will not suffice.”