Child’s best interests; Anticipatory neglect

Holding that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in XAF’s best interests, the court reversed and remanded. This appeal involved two half-siblings, XAF and IB. The “trial court provided a limited best-interest analysis. It appeared to find that termination was in XAF’s best interests because of [father’s] abuse of IB, and that the risk of harm due to XAF’s ‘vulnerability outweighed the bond the child shared’” with the father. However, the trial court did not “consider or weigh any other factor, including [father’s] parenting ability, his visitation history with XAF, or XAF’s need for permanency, stability, and finality.” Its discussion of XAF’s bond to father “was also limited to a conclusory finding that their bond did not outweigh the risk of harm; there is no discussion of the evidence the trial court relied on to determine that the pair had a bond to begin with.” To be sure, the father’s “sexual abuse of IB was a critical consideration in determining whether termination was in XAF’s best interests.” The court held that “it should not have been the only consideration.” The court concluded this was “not to say that whether XAF’s ‘safety and well-being [can be] reasonably assured’’’ in the father’s “care cannot outweigh the other factors, only that the trial court’s best-interest analysis should weigh all the available evidence.” The trial court did not do that in this case, which was error. “Further, such balancing of anticipated harm needed to be tied to XAF.” The court held that instead “of analyzing how IB and XAF might be similarly situated despite ostensible differences (i.e., XAF was respondent’s biological son, while IB was not related by blood and female), the court relied only on its perception of XAF’s inherent vulnerability as a child. This too was error.”