Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), & (j); Child’s best interests; In re Mota

Holding that §§ (c)(i) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence, and that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. As to § (j), it noted that the argument the child had not thus far been harmed missed the point, given that this provision “examines the question whether it is reasonably likely that a child ‘will be harmed’ in the future if returned to his or her parent. The evidence of the father’s instability and daily meth[] use and respondent’s insistence that she and [the child] continue to have contact with father constituted adequate evidence” showing a reasonable likelihood the child “would be emotionally or physically harmed if she were returned to respondent’s care.” The court noted that this was “especially true given the expert opinions that respondent was vulnerable to relapsing in regards to her past drug use and that she was easily manipulated. The fact that respondent was more than willing to lie about the contacts and relationship with father further supported the trial court’s ruling.” While the court agreed with respondent that § (c)(i) did not apply, there was no clear error in the determination that § (c)(ii) did. The ongoing relationship between respondent and the father “qualified as an ‘[o]ther condition[]’ that would have been adequate to trigger the [trial] court’s jurisdiction. And respondent received recommendations to rectify that condition, which was not rectified after she was given a reasonable opportunity to do so. The evidence of long-term deception by respondent on the matter and her continuing actions to stay in contact with father demonstrated that there was no reasonable likelihood that the condition would be rectified within a reasonable time considering” the child’s age. The court further concluded it was not in the child’s best interests “to continue waiting for some uncertain event in the future. While it is DHHS’s policy to keep siblings together, there is no policy reason to delay termination because a new sibling has been added to a pending child protective case.” Thus, the court held “that there was no clear error in regard to the court’s best-interests ruling.”