Temporary guardianship; MCL 700.5312(1); Request for dismissal of the petition for guardianship; MCL 700.5303(1) & MCL 700.5306(1); Special conservatorship; MCL 700.5401(3); MCL 700.5408; The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC)

In these consolidated appeals, the court vacated the trial court’s order appointing appellee-Marine-Adams as special conservator and temporary guardian of JEK, a legally incapacitated person, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with EPIC. While still of sound mind, JEK appointed respondent as his attorney-in-fact and patient advocate. Respondent was sometimes difficult to contact when JEK’s senior living residence struggled to care for him. The “trial court suspended respondent’s authority to act for JEK and appointed Marine-Adams, an independent third-party, as JEK’s temporary guardian and special conservator.” Respondent argued on appeal that “the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a temporary guardian under the circumstances,” and encouraged the court “to instruct the trial court to dismiss the petition for guardianship on remand.” The court agreed in part and disagreed in part. It concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it appointed a temporary guardian for JEK without legal authority to do so.” The record supported “only one possible conclusion—the trial court entered the order appointing Marine-Adams as JEK’s temporary guardian under MCL 700.5312(1).” The court concluded that considering “respondent had apparent authority to act on behalf of JEK, the trial court did not have authority to establish a temporary guardianship under MCL 700.5312.” But it declined respondent’s request that the trial court dismiss the petition for guardianship. It determined that at best, respondent “identified a factual dispute in the record, which the trial court will be tasked with deciding after an evidentiary hearing, should the case not be settled during mediation.” Next, the court agreed that “the trial court legally erred when it appointed a special conservator for JEK when there was no statutory authority to do so under the circumstances.” The conservatorship appeared “to have expired on its own terms and, thus, this issue may be moot.” However, because it appeared “that the trial court intended to establish the special conservatorship until the case is decided on the merits or settled,” the court addressed this issue. It concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it appointed Marine-Adams as special conservator for JEK without considering evidence or making factual findings.” The trial court could not “appoint a conservator or make a protective arrangement including appointment of a special conservator without first satisfying the requirements of MCL 700.5401(3).”