Zoning; Procedural due process; MCR 2.116(I)(1); Boulton v Fenton Twp; Notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard; Distinguishing Al-Maliki v LaGrant & Lamkin v Hamburg Twp Bd of Trs; Subject matter jurisdiction; MCR 7.122(B); MCL 125.3606(3); Krohn v City of Saginaw; Houdini Props, LLC v City of Romulus; Res judicata

In this zoning dispute, the court held that the circuit court “did not deny plaintiffs due process nor otherwise err by granting defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1), though defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4).” Plaintiffs also “were not deprived of notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard on issues that formed the basis of” the circuit court’s ruling. Further, because they failed to timely file an appeal to the circuit court to challenge the defendant-Board’s decision, the circuit court correctly found “that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.” Finally, plaintiffs’ res judicata argument failed because defendants were not granted summary disposition on that basis. They contended “they were denied procedural due process because the circuit court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1) without notifying” them in advance it was considering dismissing the amended complaint under this court rule. Their argument suggested “that MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (I)(1) are mutually exclusive grounds for granting summary disposition. However, MCR 2.116(I)(1) is a corollary to the various grounds for summary disposition stated in MCR 2.116(C).” Plaintiffs further asserted “the circuit court violated their due-process rights because the circuit court did not advise them in advance that it planned to rule under MCR 2.116(I)(1).” But unlike in Al-Maliki, the circuit court here “did not grant defendants summary disposition on an issue raised sua sponte by the circuit court. Rather, defendants moved for summary disposition contending that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to appeal the Board’s decision and because plaintiffs were not aggrieved parties. Plaintiffs responded to defendants’ motion and the parties addressed the issues at a hearing on the motion. The circuit court subsequently granted defendants summary disposition on the bases raised in their motion.” Also, unlike Lamkin, plaintiffs here “were not unaware that the circuit court was ‘contemplating summary disposition’ of their claims. Plaintiffs in this case were aware that defendants had moved for summary disposition, responded to the motion, and participated in the hearing on the motion. The circuit court thereafter granted defendants summary disposition on the grounds asserted in their motion.” Plaintiffs further argued “they lacked notice of the circuit court’s intention to address the merits of Counts 1 through 4 of their amended complaint.” But the circuit court granted defendants summary disposition on the basis it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs “had notice and an opportunity to be heard on” that issue and thus, were not denied due process.