Applicability of provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); MCL 24.264; MCL 24.306; Contempt judgments; In re Contempt of Dudzinski; Johnson v White; In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney; Michigan Department of Agriculture & Rural Development (MDARD); Temporary restraining order (TRO)

In this case arising from the suspension of a food establishment license, the grant of injunctive relief, and entry of contempt judgments, the court affirmed the circuit court’s challenged rulings. Plaintiff-MDARD suspended Marlena’s Bistro and Pizzeria’s license. Defendant-Zante owned the restaurant. “Because Pavlos-Hackney is the sole owner of both enterprises,” the court referred to her as the defendant. When she kept the restaurant open, MDARD sought a court order enjoining its operation. The circuit court entered a TRO, “which Pavlos-Hackney also defied. [It] held her in contempt and converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. [She] kept the restaurant open and the circuit court entered a second contempt judgment and a permanent injunction.” The circuit court later granted MDARD summary judgment and denied Pavlos-Hackney’s motion for a declaratory judgment. The court found that because “she did not appeal the administrative order upholding the food license suspension, Pavlos-Hackney may not now relitigate that decision. The merits of the administrative proceedings and license suspension were not at issue in the circuit court; the question before [it] was whether an injunction closing the restaurant was warranted.” She cited two APA sections, MCL 24.264 and 24.306, in arguing otherwise. The court held that neither applied. As to her challenge to the validity of the contempt judgments, the court noted the “Supreme Court has reiterated that the principles enunciated in Dudzinski apply to civil contempt.” And the court found that its decision in Johnson was “a far narrower holding than Pavlos-Hackney claims. It does not stand for the proposition that courts lack contempt jurisdiction when an underlying law is subsequently declared unconstitutional. Johnson’s holding applies only if a statute has been declared to be unconstitutional before a contempt judgment is entered. That is not what happened here. When the circuit court enjoined Pavlos-Hackney, found her in contempt, fined and jailed her, it did so in full conformity with then-existing law.” She could have challenged the validity of the administrative “order by pursuing an appeal from the administrative proceedings. She did not do so. [She] elected to bypass the administrative and subsequent judicial processes that would have afforded her a full hearing on her constitutional claims. Instead she deliberately violated two lawful court orders.”