Sentencing; Revocation of probation & imposition of a sentence of incarceration for a probation violation; MCL 771.4b(1) & (4); Plea agreement; MCR 6.302(B)-(D); People v Plumaj; Effect of a guilty or no-contest plea; People v Guyton; Principle that defendants must be fully informed about the consequences of the plea; Principle that a plea is not knowing & voluntary if the defendant is misinformed about its benefits; Remedy; Plea withdrawals; MCR 6.310; Principle that a trial court may not vacate a plea on its own motion; People v Martinez; Contracts against public policy; People v Smith

The court held that the trial court correctly ordered that defendant’s plea agreement must be vacated on the basis of his request for withdrawal. He pled guilty to larceny from the person as a second-offense habitual offender for hitting the victim with a board to get money. The trial court initially sentenced him to 12 months in jail to be followed by 3 years’ probation, but later revoked his probation and sentenced him to a minimum of 30 months in prison. On appeal, the court noted that neither party disputed that the amended statute applied, and “because defendant pleaded to his second technical probation violation, the penalty of probation revocation and 30 months to 15 years’ imprisonment violated MCL 771.4b(1) and (4).” But the parties disagreed about whether the proper remedy was for defendant to be resentenced to continued probation with incarceration for no more than 30 days, or for the plea to be vacated. The court declined “to speculate whether defendant has chosen not to seek, or accept, the remedy of plea withdrawal because he believes further negotiations would be less favorable to him.” However, in taking this position “and asking instead for resentencing, defendant is essentially asking this Court to order the trial court to reform the plea agreement in a manner that would allow him to keep the plea but change the penalty.” The court could not do so. When a trial court “rejects a sentence ‘while keeping the rest of the agreement, the trial court essentially imposes a different plea bargain on the prosecutor than he or she agreed to.’ The Smith majority held that a trial court cannot simply reject or change a term in the plea agreement without allowing the prosecutor an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement.” In these circumstances, the trial court “must give the prosecutor the opportunity to withdraw the plea.” Affirmed.