Premises liability; Duty; Christy v Glass; Case evaluation sanctions; MCR 2.403; MCR 1.102; RAD Constr, Inc v Davis; Request for prevailing-party costs; MCR 2.625

In Docket No. 360698, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the Early defendants summary disposition of plaintiff-estate’s premises liability claim. In Docket No. 361265, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of case evaluation sanctions to defendant-Joseph Early but vacated the part “of the order denying the Early defendants prevailing-party costs under MCR 2.625” and remanded. Plaintiff’s decedent, an electrician, was fatally injured while working on electrical equipment in a building. Plaintiff did “not dispute that the Early defendants did not have possession or control of the property at the time of the decedent’s accident, as” one of the Early defendants (Leitrim) sold the property to defendant-Midtown Charlotte about 10 months before. But plaintiff contended the Early defendants were “nevertheless liable for the death because they knew or should have known about the dangerous condition on the property and should have disclosed that fact to Midtown Charlotte during the sale.” Under Christy, the court concluded “the trial court did not err when it held that the Early defendants did not owe a duty of care to the decedent.” There was no dispute “that Leitrim conveyed the property to Midtown Charlotte in [11/17] on an ‘as is’ basis, that Midtown Charlotte took title after having an inspection performed on the property, and that after purchasing the property, Midtown Charlotte began significant renovations of the property, including electrical work. There was no actual relationship between the Early defendants and the decedent. Moreover, the Early defendants no longer had possession or control of the property and were, therefore, not in any position to prevent the accident.” Thus, unless plaintiff could show an exception under Christy applied, “the Early defendants had no duty to the decedent to prevent the accident.” The court held that “plaintiff failed to show that the Early defendants did not disclose to Midtown Charlotte any concealed conditions known to them that involved an unreasonable danger, i.e., the improperly installed electrical equipment.” Plaintiff suggested the court “should read Christy for the proposition that a former landowner is liable if the concealed condition is actually known or if the former landowner should have known of the dangerous condition.” And plaintiff asserted there were issues of fact for trial as to “whether Joseph Early should have known about the dangerously-installed electrical equipment.” However, the court declined “to read Christy so expansively, and plaintiff cites no court opinion following Christy that would support such a reading.” Instead, plaintiff relied on nonbinding treatises cited in Christy. But the treatise language cited by plaintiff did “not appear in Christy.”