Garnishment action; MCR 3.101; Periodic & nonperiodic garnishments; MCR 3.101(B)(1) & (2); Timeliness of disclosures; MCR 3.101(H); Default; MCR 3.101(S)(1)(a); Admissibility of evidence; MCR 3.101(M)(5); Motion to set aside a default judgment; MCL 600.4012(10)(b); Attorney fees for a frivolous garnishment action; MCL 600.2591; MCR 2.625(A)(2); Meisner Law Group PC v Weston Downs Condo Ass’n; Bill of costs; Verification; MCR 2.625(F) & (G); Interest on lawyer trust account (IOLTA)

The court held that the trial court did not err by rejecting plaintiffs’ writs of garnishment against defendants-restaurant group (Tremendous) and the former owner’s (LaVan) widow (Lynn), or by denying Lynn’s motion for sanctions. To collect on a judgment, plaintiff filed writs of nonperiodic garnishment against a number of businesses associated with LaVan, including one against Tremendous. It also filed periodic and nonperiodic writs of garnishment against Lynn in her personal capacity. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by rejecting its writs of garnishment against defendants. Plaintiff “never served Tremendous interrogatories, or noticed a deposition to Tremendous. Thus, the trial court was required to accept as true Tremendous’s assertion it was not indebted to LaVan.” Because Tremendous was not indebted to him, “there was no basis for the writ of garnishment.” As to Lynn, there was nothing in the record showing she made periodic payments to LaVan that would entitle plaintiff to a periodic garnishment. Regarding the nonperiodic garnishment, there was no “error in the trial court’s finding that Lynn did not falsely claim she did not possess or control LaVan’s property” or in its finding that the IOLTA funds at issue “belonged to LaVan and others.” And plaintiff’s challenge to Lynn’s credibility was meritless. The court next found that plaintiff’s “asserted conflicts provide[d] no explanation why the admission of [certain] evidence did not comport with MCR 3.101(M)(5) or why the trial court erred when it admitted the evidence.” It further found that the trial court did not err by granting Lynn’s motion to set aside the default judgment because the garnishment writs were not properly served. Finally, the court rejected Lynn’s challenges to the denial of her motion for sanctions. While the trial court rejected plaintiff’s position, this did not mean that it lacked legal merit. And given that the trial court found attorney fees were not compensable, “there was no need for it to explain its reasoning as the amount of attorney fees under MCR 2.625(E) because Lynn lacked the ‘permission slip’ to seek attorney fees under MCR 2.625(A).” Finally, as Lynn’s bill of costs “was not actionable for failure to include a verification[,]” the trial court did not err in rejecting it. Affirmed.