Auto negligence; Ownership liability; Applicability of MCL 257.401(1) to a driver’s intentional torts; Berry v Kipf; Hashem v Les Stanford Oldsmobile, Inc; “Assault”; Determining the gravamen of an action; Great bodily harm (GBH)

Noting that it had not issued a binding published opinion on whether a negligent act is required for owner liability under MCL 254.401(1), the court held that “ownership liability does not arise in the context of a driver’s intentional torts[.]” Thus, in these consolidated interlocutory appeals, it reversed the denial of summary disposition to two sets of defendants (one collectively referred to as HFC-MS and the other as HFC-Detroit) and remanded for entry of an order consistent with the court’s opinion. The case arose after defendant-James ran plaintiff-Reese over driving a van that purportedly belonged to HFC-MS, which HFC-Detroit had borrowed. HFC-MS and HFC-Detroit asserted the evidence clearly showed “James committed an intentional tort, rather than a negligent act” and as a result, they “could not be liable under MCL 257.401(1) because that statute requires a negligent act.” The court agreed. In Berry, a nonbinding 1987 published decision, it concluded an owner could not be liable under a former version of “this statute where the only allegation is that the alleged tortfeasor committed an intentional tort.” While the present version differs in some respects, “the Legislature retained the phrase ‘negligent operation of a motor vehicle’ when it amended the statute. Therefore, the statute still requires a negligent act, and an owner cannot be liable under the statute where the only allegation is that the alleged tortfeasor committed an intentional tort.” The court noted it was bound by its more recent holding in Hashem “that liability arises under MCL 257.401(1) where the tortfeasor commits ordinary negligence, gross negligence, or willful and wanton misconduct. But, as in Berry, we hold that liability is not impugned to an owner for a tortfeasor’s intentional tort.” Turning to the evidence here, it found “Reese’s statements in response to the motions for summary disposition establish that James’s actions amounted to an assault, not a negligent act.” In his deposition testimony, he described “two attempts by James to run him over with the van.” Further, James admitted during his criminal proceedings that while operating the van he tried “to assault Reese with the intent to do” GBH. While the complaint asserted “negligence, gross negligence, or willful and wanton misconduct, the trial court . . . should have looked beyond those labels and understood that Reese’s pleadings established that James’s actions were, in essence, an assault.”