Jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder; People v Mendoza; Intent; People v Henderson; Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Cruel & unusual punishment; People v Brown; Speedy trial; MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A); Prejudice

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant an involuntary manslaughter instruction, that his sentences were not unreasonable or disproportionate and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and that he was not denied his right to a speedy trial. He fired a gun into another vehicle, killing a 3-year-old child in the back seat. He was convicted of second-degree murder, discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle causing death, FIP, and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 66 to 100 years for the murder conviction, 30 to 60 for discharging a firearm from a vehicle causing death, 5 to 10 for FIP, and 2 years for each felony-firearm, with the latter to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively with the sentences for their respective underlying felonies. The court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter as to his murder charge. “That defendant wantonly and willfully disregarded the obvious possibility that shooting at the backseat window of another vehicle would cause great bodily harm or death was amply supported by the evidence.” The evidence did not support a conclusion that his “actions were merely negligent or careless, given the fatal consequences of discharging a gun at an occupied vehicle in freeway traffic.” As such, it did not support his theory that the child’s death was not the result of malicious action. The court also rejected his claim that his within-guidelines sentences for murder and discharging a firearm were disproportionate to his crime. “The sentence was reasonable in light of the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s failure to take responsibility for the shooting, and his demonstrably poor potential for rehabilitation. The trial court’s sentence, therefore, was ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” The court next rejected his cruel and unusual punishment argument, noting there was “little support for the theory that [his] second-degree murder was less severe than other second-degree murders, given [he] shot a firearm in anger and retaliation at an area of an occupied vehicle that obviously had the potential to contain a passenger.” Finally, as to his claim he was denied his right to a speedy trial, because he did not offer “any basis for concluding that his ability to adequately prepare or present his defense was prejudiced by the delay,” there was no evidence he suffered any prejudice from it. Affirmed.