Right against self-incrimination; Distinguishing In re Blakeman; Finding that a parent failed to benefit from services; Plain error review; Child’s best interests; In re Sanborn

Concluding Blakeman was not dispositive here, the court held that the trial court’s requirement that respondent-father admit to sexually abusing his stepdaughter “did not constitute plain error affecting his substantial rights.” The court also found no clear error in the trial court’s determination that he did not properly benefit from services or in its finding that terminating his parental rights was in his child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. Relying on Blakeman, he argued the trial court erred in determining statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence because its requirement that he “make a full admission violated his right against self-incrimination. Alternatively,” he asserted that “he complied with, and benefited from, his case service plan.” The court disagreed. It found Blakeman distinguishable, noting that in an agreement with his ex-wife in a custody case, he “agreed to complete the ‘Vanderbeck Safety Criteria,’ which required respondent to take responsibility for the sexual abuse by admitting it in detail.” The agreement also required him to identify and show “an understanding of the triggers, motives, and dynamics of the abuse. Moreover, unlike the Blakeman respondent who was not charged criminally with child abuse, in the present case, respondent was criminally charged and ultimately pleaded no-contest to attempted” CSC II. He also pled no-contest to an “allegation that he inappropriately touched [his stepdaughter’s] private parts for sexual purposes.” Further, he testified at the termination hearing that he did not remember the abuse, “but did not deny that [it] occurred. Given that [he] initially agreed to admit the abuse in detail and he entered no-contest pleas to the abuse in the criminal and child protection cases, the trial court did not violate [his] right against self-incrimination by questioning respondent’s progress in services without an admission to the abuse.” The court noted that this “child-protective proceeding was pending for over two years and the testimony showed that [respondent’s child] could not be safely returned to respondent’s home without supervision.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that statutory grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.