Standing; “Disappointed bidder”; Perkins v Lukens Steel Co.; 42 USC §§ 1981 & 1983; Whether corporations can allege a claim of racial discrimination under § 1981; Whether plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to plead its § 1981 claims of race or intentional discrimination; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Whether a consulting firm was a “state actor”; Whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged its due process & equal protection claims; Inner City Contracting (ICC); Fleis & Vandenbrink (F&V)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that “a corporation can satisfy statutory standing under § 1981” and that a corporation alleging it was not awarded a contract based on race “clearly falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute.” And it reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiff-ICC lacked standing to sue defendant-Township and its consulting company, defendant-F&V. The Township solicited a bid for building demolition. ICC, a minority-owned business, submitted the lowest bid. The next lowest (almost $1 million higher) was made by a white-owned business (nonparty-A). The Township hired F&V to review the bids and make a recommendation. F&V recommended A. Claiming F&V’s reports were inaccurate, ICC sued it and the Township in state court for constitutional, statutory, and Michigan law violations. The case was removed to federal court, where defendants successfully moved to dismiss. On appeal, the Township argued that as a “disappointed bidder,” ICC did not have standing to assert its federal claims. The court disagreed, holding that its claim was “not merely that of a disappointed bidder alleging issues with the bidding rules. ICC alleged racial discrimination, a claim seeking to vindicate its own rights rather than those of the public.” The complaint alleged “ICC suffered a cognizable injury when it lost a lucrative award and profits as a result of alleged racial discrimination[,]” i.e., both dignity and financial harm. The court next concluded corporations can allege a claim of racial discrimination under § 1981, noting that nearly “every federal court of appeals has allowed corporations to allege racial discrimination, and none have established a contrary rule.” Defendants contended “ICC did not allege sufficient facts to plead their § 1981 claims because [it] did not plead its race or intentional discrimination in the complaint.” The court disagreed, determining “ICC met its preliminary burden.” But the Township was correct that ICC’s claims against it were improperly brought “under § 1981 rather than § 1983.” As to the § 1983 claims, ICC failed to meet its burden to show “F&V is a state actor under the nexus test. Since F&V is not a state actor, it cannot be liable under § 1983, and ICC’s claims against F&V under § 1983 were properly dismissed.” In addition, it was “unable to hold the Township responsible for claims under § 1983 because of its failure to sufficiently plead Monell liability.” Further, it did not “properly allege its equal protection and due process claims.” The court reversed in part the order dismissing ICC’s claims for lack of standing and its claim against F&V under § 1981, affirmed in part the dismissal in all other respects, and remanded.