Sentencing; Reasonableness review of a within-guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); People v Steanhouse; Proportionality; People v Milbourn; Principle that the guidelines are advisory; People v Lockridge; Effect of a lowered guidelines range on resentencing; People v Johnson

Holding on remand that “defendant’s sentences were reasonable because they were ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense[s] and the offender[,]’” the court again affirmed. He was convicted of multiple crimes, including two counts of AWIM. The trial court sentenced him as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 22 to 40 years for the AWIM convictions. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a reasonableness review of the within-guidelines AWIM sentences. On remand, the court again found the sentences were reasonable. “Defendant committed the crimes after he had been released from prison and while he was on parole for, in part, an earlier unrelated AWIM conviction. Thus, after previously assaulting a person with an actual intent to kill, which, had he been successful, would have made the killing murder, [he] again acted with an intent to kill, directing his conduct at the two victims in this case.” His actions also “set off a gunfight in a public space outside a supermarket.” The court noted he was fortunate he was not “serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. We find that the 22-year concurrent minimum sentences for the AWIM convictions serve to (1) protect society from a patently dangerous individual, (2) appropriately discipline defendant for his egregious conduct, and (3) deter others from engaging in similar criminal behavior.” Further, contrary to his argument, the trial court did consider his “rehabilitative potential, astutely concluding that while defendant may have made some attitudinal improvements during his previous prison stint, ‘it doesn’t change the fact that these offenses were committed while he was on parole after having previously served time for a similar offense[.]’” The court also rejected his claim that “the 22-year minimum sentences were inherently unreasonable because the trial court did not deviate from those sentences after the guidelines range had been lowered by the court.” The trial court found this “minimum sentence, which fell within the lower half of the guidelines range, was reasonable regardless of the change in the guidelines range. This reasonable and principled determination did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” The court noted that given the “nature of the offenses and [his] criminal history, a minimum sentence toward the top end of the guidelines range would not have offended the rule of proportionality. [He] fails to articulate an argument that overcomes the presumption that the sentences were proportional.”