Attorney fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA); 42 USC § 12205; The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act; § 1988(b); Calculating the award

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s ruling awarding less than the requested amount of plaintiff-Betancourt’s attorney’s fees and costs under the ADA. Betancourt, who is disabled, sued defendant-Indian Hills Plaza under the ADA and state law, alleging that certain features made it difficult for him to access defendant’s shopping plaza. Defendant eventually remediated the violations. The district court awarded Betancourt $10,000 in attorney fees and $2,000 in costs. He originally requested $46,282.50 in attorney’s fees, and $20,320 in costs. The district court disagreed with his calculations, lowering the attorney’s hourly rate from the requested $425 to $150, and reducing the number of hours worked for “excessive billing.” It further lowered the fees “based on various deficiencies in the actions by Betancourt’s counsel during the litigation.” As to costs, it ruled that the requested amount was “unreasonable.” It deemed counsel’s travel costs avoidable and found that counsel’s expert generated “‘unnecessary and duplicative’ fees[.]” The ADA provides that “a district court, ‘in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.’” The burden falls on the requesting party to establish what is “reasonable.” The district court “calculated the lodestar amount, first by determining the appropriate rate, then by assessing the number of hours ‘reasonably expended.’” The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award. While Betancourt contended any excess fees were due to defendant’s litigation tactics, the “district court did not see things that way. According to the district court, Betancourt’s premature fee motions, not Indian Hills’ opposition to those motions, caused the exorbitant fees. We have no reason to dispute that factual finding.” As to the hourly rate, the district court was not “required to pick a rate based on the type of case.” The court also did “not see an abuse of discretion in the district court’s belief that Betancourt’s rash filings should not be included in the ultimate fee calculations.” The court agreed with Betancourt the district court erred in stating that defendant “hired an expert from Michigan when, in reality, the expert was from Minnesota. Where in the Midwest the defense expert calls home, however, does not change the fact that Betancourt hired an expert from roughly 1,500 miles away, which the district court viewed as leading to inflated costs.”