Vicarious liability; Ostensible agency; Agency by estoppel; Grewe v Mt Clemens Gen Hosp

On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that the Grewe test, as applicable here, “requires a showing of ‘reliance’ upon the apparent authority of the purported agent. The evidence fails to show such reliance, and plaintiff seemingly concedes as much in her supplemental brief.” Thus, it found that the trial court properly granted defendant-Beaumont Hospital summary disposition “on the issue of ostensible agency as laid out in Grewe, and” again affirmed this aspect of the trial court’s ruling. The issue involved Beaumont’s vicarious liability for alleged malpractice committed by defendant-Dr Lonappan, an independent contractor who treated plaintiff-Markel at Beaumont. The court concluded “for plaintiff to prevail under Grewe at the summary-disposition stage, she must show that she relied upon Beaumont’s representation, through its operation of an emergency department, that Dr. Lonappan was its agent.” The court concluded that she “failed to show such reliance.” Although she “may have relied upon Beaumont’s initial representation regarding its emergency-department doctors when she first decided to go to Beaumont, the evidence in this case indicates that she was a passive participant when she was subsequently treated by Dr. Lonappan a day later, per an agreement Dr. Lonappan’s practice group has with her physician. That is, plaintiff received medical care from whomever was assigned to her at the time by [defendant-]Hospital Consultants without any action by her or reliance on her part to any representation relating to Beaumont.” Thus, there was “no genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff relied upon Beaumont’s representation that Dr. Lonappan was its agent.”