A city board of election commissioners’ duty to appoint, “as nearly as possible,” the same number of election inspectors from each major political party; MCL 168.674(2); MCL 168.765a(2); Standing to enforce the party-composition requirements; Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ; White v Highland Park Election Comm’n; Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit; A special injury, right, or a substantial interest in the enforcement of the partisan-composition provisions; The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius; Declaratory judgment; MCR 2.605; Rose v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Mootness; Whether a moot issue is publicly significant, likely to recur, & yet likely to evade judicial review; Barrow v Detroit Election Comm’n

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendants-Flint city attorney, city assessor, and interim city clerk on the basis plaintiffs-Michigan Republican Party and Republican National Committee lacked standing to bring their claims. Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging violations of MCL 168.674 and 168.765a and seeking a declaratory judgment determining that the board of election commissioners was violating its statutory duties as to the partisan appointment of election inspectors. On appeal, as an initial matter, the court noted that “although the issues raised in this case are moot as to the 2022 general election, because the case involves a matter of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review, we will reach the merits of the appeal.” Turning to the merits, it rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendants because they have standing to bring their claims. “[C]onsidering the Michigan Election Law as a whole, it can be properly concluded that the Legislature intended to omit a right for major political party state and national organizations to challenge the partisan composition of a slate of election-inspector appointees. Indeed, the Legislature has shown that it knows how to give authority to a major political party’s statewide organization when it chooses to do so.” In addition, the Legislature has “given state and national parties the ability to have direct control over who may monitor election inspectors’ administration of polling and ballot counting.” And MCL 168.674 and 168.765a “do not provide any role directly to the state or national organizations of major political parties.” Further, plaintiffs “do not have a special right or a substantial interest in the enforcement of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) that is different from the public and do not have standing to enforce the statutes on that basis.” They also failed to show “they suffer a special injury when the partisan-composition provisions of the statutes are violated.” Finally, given “the similarity of the inquiries regarding the two theories of standing, and given that we have already concluded that plaintiffs cannot establish that they have standing on the basis of a special injury, right, or a substantial interest, we conclude that plaintiffs are not interested persons for purposes of a declaratory judgement.” Affirmed.