Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G)(2); “New evidence”; MCR 6.502(G)(3); People v Stovall; Sentencing; Retroactive change in the law; People v Poole; Alabama v Miller; Applicability of People v Parks; Facial & as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of defendant’s sentence; People v Czarnecki (On Remand); Life without parole (LWOP)

On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that while defendant met MCR 6.502(G)(2)’s procedural bar, “because he did not establish good cause or actual prejudice to justify relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), the trial court did not err by denying his motion for relief from judgment.” Further, he was not entitled to resentencing because in Czarnecki, the court “declined to extend Miller and Parks to 19-year-old offenders and” he did not establish any other change in law justifying resentencing. Finally, given that his “facial challenge to the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences imposed on 19-year-old offenders” failed, there was no ground “for retroactively applying any extension of Miller or Parks.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his third motion for relief from judgment. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder in 1987 and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. In this appeal, the court first concluded that because he “committed his crime at age 19, he is not a juvenile offender and Miller does not apply to him.” His reliance on a Connecticut federal district court decision extending Miller did not establish good cause or actual prejudice because it was not binding law. Since he filed this motion for relief from judgment, the Michigan “Supreme Court in Parks extended Miller protections to 18-year-old offenders.” But given that he was 19 years old when he committed his crime, Parks did not apply. “Because defendant did not establish good cause or actual prejudice to justify relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), the trial court did not err by denying his motion for relief from judgment.” The court further noted that, in Czarnecki, it “expressly considered whether a defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder at age 19, was entitled to resentencing on the grounds that a mandatory [LWOP] sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1 § 16” and it determined the Parks holding “did not extend to 19-year-old offenders[.]” Thus, his facial constitutional challenge failed given this binding precedent. As to his as-applied challenge, it was “not based on any new evidence or a change in law holding that it is cruel or unusual punishment to sentence a defendant convicted under an aider and abettor theory to a” LWOP sentence. To the contrary, “Michigan law expressly permits defendant’s sentence.”