Jury selection; Right to an impartial jury; People v Rose; Excusing a juror for bias; MCR 2.511(E)(2); MCR 6.412(A); Excusing jurors with previous criminal charges; MCR 2.511(D) & (E); MCL 600.1307a(1); People v Eccles; Motion to suppress; Search warrant; Probable cause; Right to present a defense; Drug profile evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Gioglio (On Remand); Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. He was convicted on multiple meth-related charges after being surveilled for several months due to suspicions of drug trafficking. On appeal, the court rejected his arguments that the trial court erred by (1) not excusing Juror 31 for cause after the juror disclosed he knew a witness (a detective), and (2) by dismissing four potential jurors based on Eccles, which he claimed was wrongly decided. Based on Juror 31’s “responses, the trial court concluded [he] was not eligible for dismissal for cause, and we ascribe no error to this decision.” And defendant “failed to develop the record to establish that the prosecutor’s request to excuse the four jurors for cause under the court rule involved improper considerations or otherwise deprived [him] of a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of the residence of one of his children’s mothers (P). “Considering all the evidence, a reasonable magistrate could conclude that there was a substantial basis for inferring a strong likelihood that meth[], or other evidence related to its processing, storage, or sale, would be found at” the address. The court next rejected his contention that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing defense counsel from asking a detective about P’s drug use and from eliciting testimony that the officers did not find any drug evidence at the other residence associated with defendant. “[E]ven if these errors could be said to have risen to the level of a preserved constitutional error, the errors would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” And evidence he challenged as drug profile evidence “was introduced for informing the jury how meth[] is cut, packaged and distributed.” Further, because a detective’s “testimony amounted to proper expert opinion on legitimate drug-profile evidence, defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object to his testimony.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that his sentences amounted to cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court’s observations reflected that it “properly considered the competing penological goals when exercising its discretion to enhance [his] sentencing ranges on the basis of his prior drug conviction.”