Search & seizure; Motion to suppress firearm evidence; “Reasonable suspicion” to prolong a traffic stop; A driver’s travel plans & other circumstances; Applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

The court held that the district court erred by denying defendant-Taylor’s motion to suppress firearm evidence seized during a traffic stop. Under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer did not have “reasonable suspicion” to prolong the stop after she completed the tasks necessary to resolve the initial stop. The officer stopped Taylor for speeding. When she returned to her patrol car to prepare Taylor’s speeding ticket, she “requested a K-9 unit, stating that Taylor’s travel plans, criminal history, and air fresheners were the ‘only reason[s]’ she wanted a dog to sniff around Taylor’s vehicle.” Although the dog alerted, drugs were not found. However, a firearm was uncovered, and Taylor was indicted for FIP. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. It was undisputed that the initial stop was lawful. The issue was whether under the totality of the circumstances, the officer “had reasonable suspicion to detain him further after she completed the tasks necessary to resolve the initial stop.” The government argued that Taylor’s travel plans gave rise to such suspicion. But the court noted that the officer never asked where Taylor was going but “admitted that she just made a guess . . . .” The government also cited his criminal history involving firearms and narcotics, the multiple air fresheners on his gear shift, and his “odd movements while searching for proof of insurance.” Although the court gave “some weight” to his criminal history, the officer stated that she did not smell anything, which impacted consideration of the air fresheners. As to Taylor’s movements, he “only made those movements when instructed by [the officer] to look for insurance proof. This, along with [her] failure to contemporaneously mention the movements when she discussed her suspicions with the K-9 officer, decreases the weight of this factor.” The court held that “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, [the officer] did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.” It rejected the government’s request to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, finding that none of the five circumstances in which the Supreme Court has endorsed its application applied here. Reversed and remanded.