Referring to jurors by number rather than name; People v Hanks; Presumption of innocence; “Anonymous jury”; People v Williams; United States v Sanchez (5th Cir); State v Tucker (WI); Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse; People v Posey

The court rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court compromised his presumption of innocence by referring to jurors by number rather than name. However, it held that the record lacked “a sufficient rationale to explain why” his within-guidelines sentence was proportional. Thus, it affirmed his second-degree murder, CCW, and felony-firearm convictions but vacated his sentences of 25 to 50 years for second-degree murder, 2 to 5 years for CCW, and 2 years for felony-firearm, and remanded for resentencing. He argued that “impaneling a jury and referencing its members only by the use of numbers infringed on” his presumption of innocence “because it suggested to the jury that he was a particularly dangerous defendant who posed a threat to the individual jurors.” But the court found that here, as in Williams, nothing in the record indicated “the trial court’s actions undermined defendant’s presumption of innocence. The trial court informed the jury venire it had the long-standing practice of referring to jurors by number. [It] emphasized there was ‘nothing special’ about any of the cases in which it applied this practice. In doing so, the trial court followed” the court’s direction in Hanks. “Based on the trial court’s statements, jurors had no reason to believe anonymity was unusual or defendant was dangerous.” However, his second-degree murder sentence was at the top of his guidelines range. In imposing sentence, “the trial court noted that it had read many letters from [victim-D’s] friends and family and clearly believed the psychological impact resulting from defendant’s murder of [D] warranted sentencing him at the higher end of his guidelines range.” Applying Posey, the court found that the trial “court’s reasoning was inadequate.” The court noted “that defendant had no significant criminal history, no history of substance abuse, and no history of mental health issues. He was gainfully employed before the shooting and in most respects appeared to be a well-adjusted individual.” The court found that the record did not “reflect whether the trial court considered [his] individual characteristics or the circumstances surrounding the offense, except to state that defendant was ‘not naïve’ in bringing firearms to” the house the night D “was killed. This does not explain how defendant’s sentence was proportionate, or how it met any of the goals of sentencing.”