Relevance; MRE 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; The rape shield statute (MCL 750.520j); People v Hackett; “Sexual conduct”; Distinguishing People v Dabb (Unpub)

After remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding evidence that defendant sought to admit involving complainant-MG’s sexual conduct, the court held that “the trial court abused its discretion by ordering admission of the evidence.” The court found that “the proposed evidence falls under the rape-shield statute as it relates to her sexual conduct.” Although her “sneaking out to get her father’s attention would not in and of itself fall under the rape-shield statute, and defense counsel seemingly did not intend to focus on the details of what occurred in the truck, the proposed evidence involved sexual conduct and does not fall under an exception to the rape-shield statute. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the proposed evidence fell under the rape shield statute, but it erred by determining that the evidence was otherwise admissible.” There was “no evidence that MG lied to the person, her parents, or the deputy.” At most, there was the act of her “leaving her house without telling one of her parents.” But, there was “no indication that it was the act of sneaking out—the only arguably deceptive act by MG—that she committed to get attention from the father. Rather, it was the meeting up with and kissing the person (who she thought was a boy). MG’s actions here are simply too attenuated to support defendant’s argument for admissibility. Thus, the evidence was not relevant to MG’s credibility and ‘would have only created a real danger of misleading the jury and an obvious invasion of the victim’s privacy.’” Defendant contended “that when MG’s attempt to get her father’s attention failed in [3/20], she ‘upped the ante by making false allegations against [defendant].’” While he relied on Dabb, the court found that case significantly different. “MG was not deflecting blame to cover up for a serious offense against another person. MG’s act of sneaking out with a person she thought was close to her age bears no similarity to the conduct of which MG accuses defendant.” As the prosecutor argued, the evidence was “only marginally relevant, if at all. The marginal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Further, excluding the evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” Reversed and remanded.