Custody; A mother’s ex parte motion for the return of her child from a putative father; The Child Custody Act (CCA); Frowner v Smith; “Parent” (MCL 722.22(i)); “Natural parent”; “Third person” (MCL 722.22(k)); Statutory presumption that custody with the parent is in the child’s best interests; MCL 722.25(1); Howard v Howard; The Acknowledgement of Parentage Act (APA); Effect of the absence of an acknowledgement of parentage; The Paternity Act; Established custodial environment (ECE)

The court held that “the trial court committed clear legal error by failing to apply the parental presumption or otherwise make a best-interests determination as required by MCL 722.25(1) before ordering that” plaintiff-mother’s child (JH) remain placed with defendant, who is one of JH’s two putative fathers. Due to an unstable housing situation, plaintiff asked defendant to temporarily take care of JH. She asserted that a month or two later, she asked him to return JH because housing had ceased to be a concern, but he refused. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for JH’s return. The court noted that defendant “was not listed on the birth certificate, did not sign an affidavit of parentage, and has not participated in genetic paternity testing.” After reviewing the CCA, APA, the Paternity Act, and case law, it found that the “trial court could award defendant ongoing custody of JH over plaintiff only if defendant ‘prove[d] that all relevant factors, including the existence of an [ECE] and all legislatively mandated best interest concerns within MCL 722.23, taken together clearly and convincingly demonstrate[d] that the child’s best interests require placement with’ [him] rather than plaintiff.” Further, in conducting this analysis, it had “to bear in mind Michigan’s ‘important public policy favoring the return of children to custodial parents who have temporarily transferred custody in order to meet those children’s needs.’” The court found that not “only did the trial court wholly fail to conduct such an evaluation, its determination was otherwise unsupported by the slim testimony at the hearing.” The court also noted that “defendant did not contest the return of JH to plaintiff, had no concerns about returning JH to [her] so long as plaintiff had ‘a place where [JH] can lay his head,’ and indicated that he could return JH to plaintiff that day if necessary. And plaintiff . . . testified she had a place to stay with her best friend, including a shared room for JH.” Reversed and remanded. To the extent JH was still in defendant’s custody “(as appears to be the case), a best-interests hearing must be held as soon as possible, and no later than 28 days from the issuance of” the court’s opinion, “to determine whether continued custody with defendant is warranted under the proper legal standards . . . .” The court retained jurisdiction.