Sentencing; Two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1); § B1.3(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii); Whether the government established that defendant could have “reasonably foreseen” that his co-conspirator had guns; United States v Woods; Procedural & substantive challenges to the late addendum to the PSR; FedRCrimP 32(g); Whether the FIP charge was part of the drug conspiracy; Consecutive sentencing; 18 USC § 3584(a); Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors

The court held that defendant-Brown should have “reasonably foreseen” that guns would be used in the charged drug conspiracy where, under the court’s precedent, the district court was entitled to infer that weapons were reasonably foreseeable given the “vast quantities” of meth involved in the trafficking operation. It also rejected his challenges to the third addendum to his PSR. Brown pled guilty to conspiring to distribute meth and FIP. He was sentenced to 310 months. The court first upheld the enhancement of his sentence under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a dangerous weapon. Brown’s main argument was that the government failed to establish that he could have “reasonably foreseen” that his co-conspirator had guns. The court noted the amount of drugs recovered—the meth “found was worth half a million dollars (when sold as a unit) and over a million dollars (when sold by the gram).” Brown admitted to knowing the quantity of drugs involved. The “district court relied on the ‘massive amount of drugs’ recovered nearby to infer that firearms were reasonably foreseeable.” The court explained that even though it has previously held that “mere participation in a drug conspiracy doesn’t make a co-conspirator’s firearm possession reasonably foreseeable[,]” it has “repeatedly affirmed that such possession is foreseeable ‘when there are massive amounts of drugs in a single location.’” As to Brown’s challenges to the third addendum to his PSR, his procedural challenge was that the late addendum (filed a day before the scheduled sentencing hearing) violated Rule 32(g). But the district court postponed the sentencing hearing for two weeks, allowing Brown “ample time” to prepare. The court also rejected his substantive challenge, in which he argued that his FIP “charge was relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy—and thus couldn’t factor into his criminal history.” The court disagreed, holding that considering “the two offenses’ elements, proximity, common victims, and common criminal plan or intent yields a straightforward conclusion. Brown’s [FIP] offense wasn’t a part of the” meth conspiracy. Among other things, his “guns weren’t found at the drug operation headquarters. They were found elsewhere, in a car outside [his] house, over a month after the drug conspiracy ended.” Lastly, the court upheld the district court’s ruling that his sentences were to run consecutively where this decision was within its discretion. The district court applied the § 3553(a) factors to each separate offense, and provided an explanation for imposing the sentences consecutively, stating it wished “to provide ‘sufficient punishment’ for two ‘separate’ criminal offenses.” Affirmed.